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I. INTRODUCTION
Chances are that today you have already unwittingly advanced
the slow but steady demise of America's freshwater supply. The
sausage and egg biscuit you ate for breakfast, the half-empty bottle of
Drano you dumped into your backyard, and the quick trip to the
grocery store-these seemingly innocent actions each significantly
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degrade American watersheds.' In response to this systemic and
persistent assault on water quality, Congress enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.2 More commonly known as the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"), this legislation attempted to take an
aggressive and comprehensive approach to improving water quality.3
To achieve its sweeping goal of "restoring [ing] and
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters," the CWA established a bifurcated regulatory
scheme.4 The first prong of the this scheme prohibits "the discharge of
any pollutant" into "navigable waters from any point source."5 Like
the drain-cleaning chemical you dumped into your backyard, a point
source is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including
but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding
operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are
or may be discharged."6 This program is complicated but effective.7
By contrast, the CWA's mechanism to regulate nonpoint
sources, the other major source of water pollution, is largely
ineffective.8 A nonpoint source is defined as "any source of water
1. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS 10-11 (2009) (itemizing and analyzing comprehensively data from the 2004 reporting
cycle and noting that "major pollutant source categories" include "agriculture" such as "feedlots,"
"urban-related runoff' including "highway and road runoff," and "municipal discharges/sewage").
Section 305(b) of the Clean Water Act requires states to provide biennial "description[s] of the
water quality of all navigable waters in such State during the preceding year" and "a description
of the nature and extent of nonpoint sources of pollutants and recommendations as to the
programs which must be undertaken to control each category of such sources, including an
estimate of the costs of implementing such programs." Clean Water Act § 305(b), 33 U.S.C.§ 1315(b) (2012).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816-904 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012)); see ROBERT V. PERCIVAL
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 645 (6th ed. 2009).
3. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 645.
4. Clean Water Act § 101(a). This section, the "Congressional declaration of goals and
policy," is breathtaking because of its ambitious goal of "[eliminating] the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters [of the United States] by 1985." Id.
5. Id. § 301 (prohibiting such discharge); id. § 502(12) (providing the relevant definitions);
see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 647-48 (explaining the operation of the CWA).
6. Clean Water Act § 502(14). Note that this definition explicitly exempts "agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture." Id.
7. See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the Clean Water Act Been a
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 591 (2004) ("The CWA has produced a great deal of progress
during the past thirty years. The discharge of organic wastes from publicly-owned waste
treatment facilities has dropped 46%, while similar discharges from industry have fallen 98%.").
8. Andreen, supra note 7, at 593 ("The CWA has never addressed non-point source
pollution in a straightforward comprehensive way .... Approximately 82% of the rivers and
streams that fail to meet water quality standards and 77% of such lakes are impaired because of
[non-point source pollution.]"). The most recent data confirms that nonpoint source pollution is
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pollution that does not meet the legal definition of 'point source' in
section 502(14) of the Clean Water Act."9 In other words, nonpoint
source pollution is anything that cannot be traced to a single
discernable point-chemical runoff from construction sites, excess
fertilizers from farmers' fields, etc. Although the CWA evinces a clear
intent to control nonpoint source pollution,10 the CWA's mechanism to
achieve that goal has fallen disappointingly short." This failure has
far-reaching consequences. Indeed, nonpoint source water pollution is
responsible for impairingl2 the vast majority of rivers, streams, and
lakes that cannot achieve the Act's quality goals.' 3
A new approach is desperately needed. To that end, a market-
driven system known as "private governance" shows great promise.14
Put simply, private governance relies on private institutions to solve
public problems-such as social welfare, prisons, and food safety-
that stem from public regulatory inefficiencies and failures.'6 Private
governance programs have been particularly successful in addressing
persistent environmental and sustainability dilemmas.16 This Note
still the largest obstacle to attaining water quality standards. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National
Summary of State Information, WATERSHED ASSESSMENT, TRACKING & ENVTL. RESULTS,
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/tmdLwaterslO/attainsnation_cy.control#totalassessed_waters (last
updated Oct. 2, 2013). Agriculture- and urban-related runoff are the first and fifth greatest
source of river and stream impairment; the third and tenth greatest sources of lake, reservoir,
and pond impairment; eighth and ninth great source of bay and estuary impairment; and the
eighth and fourth greatest source of coastal shoreline impairment. Id.
9. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, What Is Nonpoint Source Pollution?, WATER HOME,
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/whatis.cfm (last updated Aug. 27, 2013).
10. See Clean Water Act § 101(a)(7) ("[Ilt is the national policy that programs for the control
of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to
enable the goals of this chapter to be met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources
of pollution.").
11. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 9 (demonstrating that nonpoint source
pollution is largely uncontained and mostly responsible for the impairment of U.S. waters).
12. See infra note 80 for a discussion of the meaning of "impaired" and "threatened" in the
context of water quality.
13. See Andreen, supra note 7, at 593 (pinpointing nonpoint source water pollution as
responsible for eighty-two percent of river and stream impairment and seventy-seven percent of
lake impairment).
14. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (detailing the development of private governance and developing a holistic
framework for its application to environmental law).
15. See infra Part IV for an extensive discussion of private governance.
16. A twelve-member Steering Committee composed of international business and civil
society leaders and academic experts recently announced:
In the past five years, the number of new standards and certification programs has
increased exponentially .... The breadth of focus of these systems has grown as well,
to include sectors and resources such as water, mining, carbon and climate, tourism,
and aquaculture. It is likely that a key driver of this growth is a recognition that early
standards systems have succeeded in carving out a highly visible place in the
marketplace, which other initiatives seek to emulate.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
demonstrates that private governance could play an important role in
reducing nonpoint source pollution by bridging the regulatory gap left
by the CWA.17
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part II explores the history
of water pollution in the United States and lays out the contours of the
CWA's regulatory scheme. This history is particularly instructive
because it demonstrates that this country is already accustomed to
using heavy doses of both voluntary and mandatory regulatory
programs to neutralize water pollution. Part III analyzes the
successes and failures of the CWA, with an emphasis on nonpoint
pollution controls. This Part also examines judicial and state
responses to the CWA's inability to reduce nonpoint pollution. Part IV
evaluates private governance as a solution to the government's
regulatory ineptitude. In particular, this Part examines two potential
schemes. One is a wholly private solution-a private organization
acting as a clearinghouse for private companies whose production
processes generate substantial nonpoint source pollution. The other is
a hybrid solution-the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
acting as a clearinghouse for private companies whose production
processes generate substantial nonpoint pollution, like the Energy
Star program.' 8 Ultimately, this Note concludes that private
governance holds promise as an important piece of the water quality
regulatory puzzle, but it is insufficient to solve the problem on its own.
Supplementing public regulations with private governance schemes is
a low-risk, high-reward approach to ameliorating nonpoint source
pollution. Part V concludes.
STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS AND
CERTIFICATION, RESOLVE, INC., TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF
CERTIFICATION 8 (2012), available at http://www.resolv.org/site-assessment/files/2012/06/Report-
Only.pdf.
17. Id. at 72 ("It seems that the extent of impacts differs considerably from case to case.").
18. See generally U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, About ENERGY STAR, ENERGY STAR,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfmc=about.abindex (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). The Energy
Star program serves as a successful model of a public-private hybrid-labeling program. The EPA
and Department of Energy jointly administer the program, which offers an "Energy Star" label to
household products (such as washing and drying machines) that reduce energy usage beyond a
certain threshold. Id.
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II. POLLUTION, POLLUTION EVERYWHERE: THE CLEAN WATER ACT AS A
RESPONSE TO RUNAWAY WATER POLLUTION
A. Pre-Clean Water Act Attempts at Water Quality Control
The first attempts at water quality control in this country were
common-law nuisance claims brought by states and private actors.'9
Two early twentieth-century cases from the U.S. Supreme Court are
illustrative. In Missouri v. Illinois, Missouri sued to enjoin Chicago's
discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River. 20 Missouri alleged that
Chicago's sewage sent "1,500 tons of poisonous filth daily into the
Mississippi."21 Similarly, in New York v. New Jersey, New York sued
to prevent New Jersey from dumping refuse into a shared bay. 22
States had to bring tort suits to abate water pollution because
policymakers at the time viewed water pollution control as a local
responsibility. 23
On the rare occasion that Congress created national water
policy, water quality was not a priority.24 For example, the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 aimed to "prevent interferences
with navigation."25 The Act did impose fines for discharging "refuse"
into navigable waters, 26 which evolved into the first federal water
19. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 643 (citing early cases of bringing nuisance actions
to enjoin water pollution).
20. 200 U.S. 496, 517 (1906). The Court dismissed Missouri's claim on the ground that
Missouri could not prove its increased disease incidence was a result of Chicago's discharges. Id.
at 525-26 ("The presence of causes of infection from the plaintiffs action makes the case weaker
in principle as well as harder to prove than one in which all came from a single source.").
21. Id. at 517.
22. 256 U.S. 296, 298-99 (1921). As they did in Missouri v. Illinois, the Court dismissed the
plaintiffs claim for want of causation. Id. at 312-13:
[W]e must conclude that the complainants have failed to show ... that the sewage
which the defendants intend to discharge into Upper New York Bay ... would so
corrupt the water of the bay as to create a public nuisance by causing offensive odors
or unsightly deposits on the surface or that it would seriously add to the pollution
of it.
23. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 643 ("Even though states asked the Supreme
Court to umpire interstate sewage disposal disputes, water pollution control was considered
largely a local responsibility.").
24. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of
Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 527, 528-29 (2005) (noting that the legislation was designed to facilitate interstate
commerce); see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 643 ("[Early federal legislation] was not to
protect water quality but to prevent interferences with navigation, the lifeblood of American
commerce then.").
25. PERCIVAL ETAL., supra note 2, at 643.
26. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (Refuse Act of 1899), ch. 425, § 13, 30
Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2012)). The initial iteration of the
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quality control device; however, there is no indication that Congress
originally intended to regulate water quality.27 Rather, the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act only sought to maintain the navigability of
waterways.
In 1948, Congress finally passed legislation expressly designed
to combat water pollution and improve water quality, though the
federal government's regulatory role was still largely peripheral.28 The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 authorized the federal
government to act in a "very secondary position in relation to the
states in water quality matters."29 The Act, among other things,
provided federal funding for water pollution research, new water
treatment facilities (via loans), and state-administered water quality
programs.30 Though notable for its comprehensiveness, the Act still
represented a baby step as Congress explicitly stated that it was
intended to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of the States in controlling water
pollution."31 Even the authorization for independent federal action
was heavily circumscribed; the federal government could only proceed
with a public nuisance action after securing approval from state
officials and issuing "a complicated series of notices, warnings,
hearings, and conference recommendations." 32
As the century progressed, so did the federal government's
efforts to combat water pollution. Congress bolstered the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act with amendments in 1956 and 1961.33
The 1956 amendment created direct funding (in place of the loan
program) for municipal treatment facilities, while the 1961
Refuse Act imposed penalties of between $500 and $2500 and between thirty days and one year
imprisonment, per violation. Id. § 16. In 1996, a maximum penalty of up to $25,000 per day
replaced the minimum fine and the prison penalties remained unchanged. Water Resources
Development Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-303, § 218(a), 110 Stat. 3658, 3696 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 411 (2012)).
27. See Murchison, supra note 24, at 529-30 (noting that the Refuse Act "was important in
shaping modern legislation.").
28. See id. at 529 ("Congress delayed significant federal pollution control legislation until
the middle of the twentieth century."); see also History of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act (last updated Apr. 17,
2013) ('The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 was the first major U.S. law to address
water pollution.").
29. N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality Part III:
The Federal Effort, 52 IOWA L. REV. 799, 810 (1967).
30. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub L. No. 80-845, §§ 2-8, 62 Stat. 1155-
59.
31. Id.
32. Murchison, supra note 24, at 531; see also Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1948 § 2.
33. Murchison, supra note 24, at 531-32.
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amendment increased funding for existing programs and expanded
the reach of the statute to include coastal waters. 3 4 Although these
amendments broadened the previously paltry federal role in water
pollution control, the legislation had a modest effect at best.
The Water Quality Act of 1965 took another step in the
direction of expanding the federal government's regulatory authority
over water pollution.35 Most notably, the Water Quality Act forced
states to create and administer water quality standards for interstate
waters. 36 To enforce this requirement, Congress required water
quality standards to be approved by the newly minted Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration ("FWPCA"). 37 Unfortunately, this
mechanism lacked real teeth-if a state failed to adopt an adequate
standard, the FWPCA could only adopt its own standards "after a
lengthy and difficult process."38 Still, the legislation signaled
Congress's desire to devote federal resources to water pollution issues.
Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
two more times before 1972.39 However, these relatively minor
amendments left the regulatory environment essentially unchanged,
and many states failed to establish water quality standards. 40
Despite this slow but steady expansion of federal authority,
water pollution control efforts gained little traction prior to the
CWA. 41 Federal attempts to rein in water pollution were so impotent
that in 1971, the Senate Committee on Public Works concluded that
"the national effort to abate and control water pollution has been
34. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70 Stat.
498; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204.
The most significant change was broadening the definition (and thus scope of the Act) of
"interstate or navigable waters" to encapsulate all coastal waters. § 9, 75 Stat. at 210. For a more
complete description of these amendments, see Murchison, supra note 24, at 531-32.
35. Water Quality Control Act of 1965, Pub L. No 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; see also PERCIVAL ET
AL., supra note 2, at 644 (noting that the Water Quality Control Act of 1965 "strengthened [the]
provisions" of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
36. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 644 ("[These provisions] requir[ed] states to adopt
water quality standards for interstate waters .... ).
37. Water Quality Act, 75 Stat. at 908; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 644.
38. PERCIVAL ETAL., supra note 2, at 644.
39. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91.
40. See Murchison, supra note 24, at 533 ("The legislation did not, however, change the
basic structure of water pollution control regulations."). The 1966 amendment primarily
expanded several grant programs and established incentives for state compliance with the
federal water quality standards requirements. Id. The 1970 amendment, responding to a pair of
oil spills, created a system of strict liability for oil spills in American waters. Id.
41. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 644 (noting that "[b]y 1972 only about one-half of the
states had water quality standards").
545
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inadequate in every vital aspect."42 At the time, the federal
government had only brought a single Federal Water Pollution
Control Act enforcement action.43
Fortunately for the nation's waters, important legal and
political changes were already underway. First, a pair of Supreme
Court decisions in the 1960s laid the groundwork for the CWA. The
Refuse Act (originally the enforcement tool of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899) authorized fines and imprisonment for
those who dumped refuse into "navigable waters."44 To compensate for
the weakness of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") began prosecuting polluters under the
Refuse Act as a means to improve water quality, even though the
legislation was intended to facilitate transportation (by preventing
refuse from clogging the nation's waterways). 45 In response, aggrieved
polluters twice challenged this application of the Refuse Act, and twice
the Court sided with the DOJ. 46 Both opinions were authored by
Justice Douglas, greatly expanded the scope of the Refuse Act and
partially filled the gap left by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. 47 These decisions cemented the transformation of the Refuse Act
into a powerful new pollution control tool.
Shortly thereafter, Congressman Reuss followed Justice
Douglas's lead. Seeking to capitalize on the Court's environmentally
favorable reading of the Refuse Act, Congressman Reuss leveraged his
position as chairman to persuade the House Subcommittee on
Conservation and Natural Resources to issue a report recommending
increased use of the qui tam provisions of the Refuse Act. 48 To
42. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 3668, 3674.
43. Id.
44. § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970)); see supra notes 25-
27 and accompanying text (describing the Refuse Act of 1899 in greater detail).
45. § 13, 30 Stat. at 1152; Murchison, supra note 24, at 534-35.
46. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966) ("The word 'refuse' includes
all foreign substances and pollutants apart from those 'flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state' into the watercourse."); United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485 (1960) ("[Tjhe industrial deposits placed by respondents in the Calumet
have . . . created an 'obstruction' within the meaning of [section 10] of the Act . . . .").
47. See Murchison, supra note 24, at 534-36 (detailing how these decisions allowed the DOJ
to prosecute polluters via the Refuse Act). The twin decisions took different approaches to
expanding the Refuse Act. In Republic Steel Corp., Justice Douglas interpreted the Refuse Act's
exemption for liquid sewage from sewers and streets narrowly. 362 U.S. at 490-91. In Standard
Oil Co., Justice Douglas interpreted the term "refuse" broadly, to expand the Refuse Act's reach.
384 U.S. at 225-26. By reading the exemptions narrowly and construing mandates broadly,
Justice Douglas almost single-handedly turned the Refuse Act into a pollution reduction tool.
48. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 644 ("Congressman Henry Reuss ... saw the Refuse
Act's promise as a tool for dramatic action against the growing water pollution problem."). The
[Vol. 67:2:539546
2014] PRIVATE GOVERNANCE & WATER POLLUTION
generate momentum, Reuss publicized a list of 270 companies that
were regularly discharging refuse without a permit.49
President Nixon responded to this building wave of political
and social pressure in December of 1970. Executive Order 11,574
instituted a regulatory program administered by the Army Corps of
Engineers whereby a permit would be required to discharge any
substance (except unadulterated water) into a navigable water.50 Over
twenty-three thousand permit applications flooded the Corps in the
following months.51
In sum, in the early 1970s, the federal government's role in
regulating water pollution consisted of various piecemeal judicial,
congressional, and executive responses. In an effort to untangle this
morass, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972-better known as the Clean Water Act.52
B. The Clean Water Act
The CWA represents an ambitious and comprehensive effort to
eliminate "the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters by
1985."53 Though the CWA includes dozens of ancillary "support"
provisions, such as funds for research, 54 grants for construction of
treatment facilities,55 and state grants,56 the heart of the scheme is a
bifurcated program for regulating pollutant discharges. Indeed,
Congress declared that "it is the national policy that programs . . . be
developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable
qui tam provisions provide "a common law remedy allowing citizens to prosecute crimes and keep
half the fines paid." Id.
49. See Robert L. Potter, Comment, Discharging New Wine into Old Wineskins: The
Metamorphosis of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 486-89 (1972)
(detailing how "Congressman Reuss began to forward to the Department of Justice information
of discharges committed without an immunizing permit").
50. 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627 (Dec. 25, 1970); see Potter, supra note 49, at 489-90 (announcing
that "that the Army Corps of Engineers would institute a comprehensive regulatory program for
issuing permits under section 13 of the R&HA of 1899, a program which would apply to all
discharges of any matter other than pure water"); see also id., at 489-90 (explaining the effect of
the executive order). President Nixon's executive order, building off the work of Justice Douglas
and Congressman Reuss, located its authority in section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899-the Refuse Act.
51. PERCIVAL ETAL., supra note 2, at 645.
52. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816-904 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-387 (2012)).
53. Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1). Though this goal predictably fell short, it demonstrated
Congress's intent to seriously reduce water pollution.
54. Id. § 105.
55. Id. § 201.
56. Id. § 601.
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the goals of [the CWA] to be met through the control of both point and
nonpoint sources of pollution."5 7
Though point sources are not the subject of this Note, a brief
description of the regulatory device for this type of pollution is useful
because it provides a contrast with how the CWA treats nonpoint
sources. Point sources are defined as "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance."58 Point source discharges are subject to the most
stringent controls in the CWA. 59 The starting point is section 301,
which requires "nationally uniform, technology-based limits on point
source discharges."60 To achieve this, section 301 sets liquid waste
(known as "effluent") limitations, which are essentially constraints on
the amount of a pollutant that any point source can legally
discharge. 61 To implement these limitations, section 402 created the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES").62 The
NPDES issues permits that contain technology-based effluent
limitations designed to reduce or eliminate pollutant levels in each
discharge. Point source polluters who do not first receive an NPDES
permit face stiff financial and criminal penalties. The end result is a
rigid command-and-control scheme that forces polluters to comply or
suffer serious consequences. 63
Comparatively, the nonpoint source regulatory program is
quite lenient. Three sections of the CWA specifically target nonpoint
source pollution. First, section 208 encourages states to develop and
implement plans to reduce certain nonpoint source pollutants in
return for funding and technical support.64 Second, Congress added
section 319 to the CWA in 1987, which offers federal financial and
57. Id. § 101(a)(7). This provision was added as an amendment in 1987. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 648.
58. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 648-49 ("While the [CWA] concentrates its
regulatory firepower on pollution from point sources, [Congress later added a section articulating
goals for nonpoint sources].").
59. Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012). Examples of point sources
"includ[e] but [are] not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id.
60. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 649.
61. Clean Water Act § 301.
62. Id. § 402.
63. See Andreen, supra note 7, at 549-50 ("The CWA also created a wide array of federal
sanctions for violations of the Act. In doing so, Congress gave EPA enormous power to enforce
the Act through the use of administrative compliance orders, administrative penalties, civil suits
for injunctive relief and civil penalties, and even criminal sanctions.").
64. Clean Water Act § 208; see also Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing
Federalization of Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 179, 187 (2000)
("[Congress] relegated nonpoint source management to general area-wide waste management
planning.").
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technical assistance incentives to states that create their own plans to
control nonpoint source pollution.65 The final piece of the CWA
nonpoint scheme is section 303, which establishes the Total Maximum
Daily Load ("TMDL") program.66 The TMDL program requires states
to set water quality standards for all navigable bodies of water within
their borders.67 A TMDL sets daily limits on the total amount of a
given nonpoint pollutant that can be added to a body of water.68 To
effectuate the daily limits, states create a "load allocation" for each
type of nonpoint source, such as agriculture or urban runoff.69 The
TMDL program has certainly been the CWA's most effective nonpoint
pollution control device, though it leaves much to be desired, as will be
explained in Part 111.70
III. PLUGGING THE GAPS: JUDICIAL AND STATE RESPONSES TO THE
CLEAN WATER ACT'S SHORTCOMINGS ON NONPOINT SOURCE
POLLUTION
A. A Glass Half Full: How Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Presents a
Troubling Exception to the Otherwise Effective Clean Water Act
In most areas, the CWA has been a success story, with some
environmental law scholars even hailing it as "one of the greatest
successes in environmental law."7 1 Broadly speaking, the CWA
represented a paradigm shift in environmental regulation. It made
command-and-control (as opposed to voluntary) regulation a palatable
policy prescription. Specifically, the CWA required private polluters to
install effective pollution reduction technologies regardless of cost, an
approach that was emulated by the Clean Air Act and several other
65. Clean Water Act § 319.
66. Id. § 303.
67. Id.
68. Craig, supra note 64, at 187-88.
69. Corey Longhurst, Note, Where is the Point? Water Quality Trading's Inability to Deal
with Nonpoint Source Agricultural Pollution, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 175, 179-80 (2012) ("With
the priority schedule in place, states must establish TMDLs for each pollutant impairing each
water according to the schedule . . .. Once the sources are identified, the TMDL is a plan to
ratchet down pollution through 'wasteload allocations' for point sources and 'load allocations' for
nonpoint sources.").
70. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 739 ("TMDLs have become the true 'sleeping
giant' of the [CWA]."); see also Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV The Final Frontier, 29 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10469, 10471 (1999) ("TMDLs are now taking the field and forcing a showdown on the last
water quality frontier, non-point source pollution.").
71. James Salzman, Why Rivers No Longer Burn, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2012, 5:20 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/healthand-science/science/2012/12/clean-water act_40th-anniver
sary-.thegeatest successin-environmental_1aw.single.html.
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major environmental statutes. 72 Thus, although the CWA is
technically focused on the nation's water supply, the Act has had a
profound influence in other arenas and represents a triumph for those
who advocate for a stronger federal role in environmental regulation
in general.
In addition to initiating a shift in federal environmental
regulatory policy overall, the CWA also made significant headway in
achieving its stated goal of improving the quality of American
waters.73 Water quality analyses help to illustrate the "truly
extraordinary progress" made since the CWA was enacted.74 Publicly
owned waste treatment facilities are emitting forty-six percent less
organic waste while industry sources are emitting ninety-eight
percent less organic waste.75 Nationwide, the number of waters
meeting or exceeding water quality goals has almost doubled.76
Statistics aside, these successes are visible to the naked eye:
Watersheds in Kansas City, Cleveland, and Hartford (among others)
that were formerly awash in pollution are now the centerpieces of
economic redevelopment initiatives."7
72. See id.:
[T]he act took a completely new approach to environmental protection. The law flatly
stated there would be no discharge of pollutants from a point source (a pipe or ditch)
into navigable waters without a permit. No more open sewers dumping crud into the
local stream or bay. Permits would be issued by environmental officials and require
the installation of the best available pollution-control technologies.
Many of these "landmark" principles reappeared in later federal environmental regulation. For
example, the Clean Air Act imposes an analogous technology mandate while the Resource
Conversation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) both adopted a similar command and control
regulatory approach. Id.
73. See Andreen, supra note 7, at 591 ("The Clean Water Act has produced a great deal of
progress during the past thirty years.").
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Salzman, supra note 71.
77. See id. ("Once a convenient dumping ground for all manner of filth, rivers now represent
an urban gem. Hartford, Conn.; Kansas City, Kan.; Cleveland; and other cities have based much
of their redevelopment around their now clean and inviting waters, with waterfront parks and
the lure of fishing and trails along the water's edge."); see also Andreen, supra note 7, at 591-92:
Truly extraordinary progress, therefore, has been experienced in places as diverse as
the Delaware estuary and the Chattahoochee River, New York Harbor, and the
Potomac estuary. The progress, moreover, is not limited to just conventional
pollutants, but includes heavy metals and toxic water pollutants. As a result,
Pittsburghers today enjoy their three rivers as a place for picnics and boating and
summer arts festivals, and from Boston to Baltimore to Savannah, Americans are
finding beauty and recreation along their restored harbors.
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Despite these laudable achievements, the CWA is at best a
"glass half full."78 By a wide margin, American watersheds are still
either "threatened" or "impaired."79 According to the best estimates
available, more than half of the rivers and streams, more than two-
thirds of the lakes and ponds, about two-thirds of the bays and
estuaries, and nearly four-fifths of all wetlands are either impaired or
threatened. 0 Even these startling statistics can mask the true extent
of impairment; oftentimes watersheds are too toxic for even basic
usages, such as fishing or swimming.'
So what explains the CWA's promising but limited results? The
answer lies in the difference between point source and nonpoint source
pollution. The CWA has been very effective at controlling point source
discharges and comparatively ineffective at reducing nonpoint source
discharges. In fact, about eighty-two percent of rivers and streams and
seventy-seven percent of lakes qualify as "impaired" solely because of
nonpoint source pollution.82 The largest obstacle to attaining water
quality goals for the vast majority of American waters is finding a way
to rein in nonpoint source pollution.83
There are several distinct difficulties that hinder efforts to
reduce nonpoint source water pollution. Most importantly, nonpoint
78. See Salzman, supra note 71 ("But the glass is only half full, for major challenges
remain.").
79. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 9. "Threatened waters" are defined as
"waters. . . [that] currently support all of their designated uses [recreation, drinking, etc], but
one or more of those uses may become impaired in the future . . . if pollution control actions are
not taken." "Impaired waters" are defined as "[waters for which] any one of its uses is not met."
Id. See Salzman, supra note 71 ('The EPA estimates that about half of our rivers and streams,
one-third of lakes and ponds, and two-thirds of bays and estuaries are 'impaired waters,' in many
cases not clean enough for fishing and swimming.").
80. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 9. There is an important caveat to these
calculations. At the time of reporting, water quality data was only available for sixteen percent of
the nation's rivers and streams (in terms of mileage), twenty-nine percent of the nation's bays
and estuaries (in terms of surface area), and thirty-nine percent of the nation's lakes and ponds
(in terms of acreage). PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 638. Despite the fairly limited number of
water bodies for which data is available, the NSSI is the most comprehensive, accurate, and
unified body of data on the state of the nation's collective watersheds.
81. See Salzman, supra note 71 (noting that waters are "in many cases not clean enough for
fishing and swimming"). The process of determining a "designated use" is complicated and
subject to extensive EPA regulations. See Water Quality Standards Handbook-Chapter 2:
Designation of Uses, 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (2013), available at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/
swguidance/standards/handbook/chapter02.cfm#section1.
82. Andreen, supra note 7, at 593.
83. Agriculture and urban-related runoff (two major nonpoint sources of water pollution)
are the first and fifth greatest source of river and stream impairment; the third and seventh
greatest sources of lake, reservoir, and pond impairment; seventh and eleventh great source of
bay and estuary impairment; and the fourth and fifth greatest source of coastal shoreline
impairment. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 9.
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source pollution is fundamentally harder to control than point source
pollution. While the NPDES permit program can target discrete point
sources, nonpoint source discharges "come[] from farms, cities,
forests, mining operations, and construction sites."84 Devising a
permitting program to control the discharge from each household (e.g.,
chemicals, cleaners), farm (e.g., fertilizers, pesticides), and road (e.g.,
oil, gas, antifreeze) presents a difficult8 5 and potentially expensive86
task. Moreover, nonpoint source discharges are usually addressed at
the local level given the need to target individual sources (specific
fields, cars/roads, households, etc.).87 Unfortunately, the incentives for
control are misaligned at the local level. Because nonpoint pollution
seeps into groundwater, it is eventually exported to other states and
localities. Thus, the brunt of the negative consequences are felt
elsewhere, and local governments lack the motivation to reduce their
respective nonpoint source discharges. 8
Strong industry interests also stand in the way of establishing
effective nonpoint source regulatory controls. To ensure sufficient
congressional support from farm states, the CWA categorically
exempts "agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from
irrigated agriculture" from the NPDES permitting requirements that
apply to other point sources.89 This effectively shifts agricultural
runoff-the single largest source of watershed impairment 90-from the
rigorous NPDES program to the comparatively lax and ineffective
regulatory scheme for nonpoint sources.
84. Longhurst, supra note 69, at 180 (citation omitted).
85. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be
Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV., 479, 479 (1989) ("Nonpoint pollution comes from a variety of
sources that require different types of controls.").
86. See id. ("Nonpoint sources resist controls because they are expensive, and the expense is
not easily passed on to consumers.").
87. See id. ("Nonpoint source controls are difficult to coordinate because they are usually
administered by local rather than state governments.").
88. See id. ("Local governments do not have an incentive to adopt nonpoint source controls
because their nonpoint source pollution usually is exported elsewhere.").
89. Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012); see Longhurst, supra note 69, at
182-83 ("Because nonpoint source pollution is not covered under the NPDES permit
requirement, agricultural pollution is largely unregulated under the CWA. In fact, point sources
are defined to explicitly exclude 'agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from
irrigated agriculture.' " (citations omitted)); Salzman, supra note 71 ('To gain sufficient
congressional support from farm states in 1972, the Clean Water Act largely exempted runoff
from agricultural fields and irrigation ditches.").
90. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 9; see also James Boyd, The New Face of the
Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA's New TMDL Rules, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL'Y F.
39, 45 (2005) (pointing out that agricultural runoff is the largest source of water pollution in the
United States); Longhurst, supra note 69, at 176 ("Agricultural pesticides, fertilizers, and
manure are the largest contributors to water pollution in the United States.").
552 [Vol. 67:2:539
2014] PRIVATE GOVERNANCE & WATER POLLUTION 553
Finally, the voluntary nature of the CWA's nonpoint regulatory
scheme reduces its effectiveness. Standing in stark contrast to the
CWA's compulsory permitting requirements and coercive technology
controls for point sources, the Act's nonpoint source pollution controls
are completely voluntary.9 ' The CWA's major nonpoint source
regulatory provisions, including section 20892 (providing funds to
states to incentivize nonpoint source management programs) and
section 319 (same),93 lack any enforcement provisions should a state
enact inadequate regulations or simply refuse to participate at all.94
Even the CWA's most robust nonpoint source control device,
the TMDL program in section 303(d), has done little to reduce
pollution discharges.95 TMDLs only require states to follow best
management practice ("BMP") requirements (which the CWA fails to
proscribe) and voluntary enforcement schemes.96 In sum, the CWA
fails to prescribe a mandatory, enforceable control regime for nonpoint
sources in the same way that it does for point source discharges.
91. See Chelsea Congdon et al., Economic Incentives and Nonpoint Source Pollution: A Case
Study of California's Grasslands Region, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 215, 221
(2008):
[The CWA still does not require s[t]ates to implement nonpoint source regulatory
programs. Nor does it authorize the EPA to promulgate a federal program in the
absence of an adequate state program. In sum, while Congress expressed the clear
intent to address nonpoint source pollution, the language of the CWA fails to ensure
effective nonpoint source pollution control.
(citations omitted).
92. See Craig, supra note 64, at 186-89 (describing the section 208 regulatory mechanism).
Section 208 provides that state governors should designate 'local management authorities" for
areas with nonpoint source water pollution issues.
93. See id. at 189-91 (describing the section 319 regulatory mechanism). Section 208
represents the CWA's original attempt to reduce nonpoint source water pollution. In 1987,
responding to § 208's failure to produce any meaningful reduction in nonpoint source discharges,
Congress added § 319. Even though Section 319 creates a more robust regulatory device (states
must submit nonpoint source pollution reduction plans to the EPA to receive federal funding for
them), it "provides no real means of enforcement." Id. at 190.
94. The basic division of point source and nonpoint source regulatory authority between the
federal government and state governments, respectively, presents an interesting and important
federalism question. Unfortunately, such a discussion is outside the purview of this paper. For a
more thorough discussion of this issue, see Craig, supra note 64, at 181-84 (discussing
federalism in the context of the CWA's regulatory division).
95. See id. at 228 (discussing the consequence of the TMDL program).
96. Id. Though the CWA's text does not define or require specific BMPs, EPA regulations
characterize BMPs as "schedules of activities, prohibitions of practices, maintenance procedures,
and other management practices to prevent or reduce the pollution of waters of the United
States, BMPs also include treatment requirements, operating procedures, and practices to
control plant site runoff, spillage or leaks, sludge or waste disposal, or drainage from raw
material storage." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013).
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B. Judicial Responses
Despite the CWA's shortcomings, several key developments in
the judiciary breathed new life into federal regulation of nonpoint
source pollution. Initially, during the early years of the CWA, section
303(d) fell by the wayside.97 However, by the 1980s and 1990s,
environmental groups sought to revive the TMDL program.98 A series
of lawsuits filed by these groups claimed that state TMDLs were
either inadequate or never created at all. 99 Adverse judicial decisions
eventually compelled the EPA to set TMDL production schedules for
over twenty states.100 At this point, it became clear that the EPA was
required to produce TMDLs for waters impaired by both point and
nonpoint source discharges, but a critical question remained: were
TMDLs mandatory for waters polluted solely by nonpoint source
runoff? 10
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the
affirmative in Pronsolino v. Nastri.102 In that landmark case, a
California family (the Pronsolinos) and several agricultural interest
groupS103 sought to block implementation of the TMDL for the Garcia
River, a body of water polluted only by nonpoint sources. 104 For the
Pronsolinos, the load restrictions in the Garcia River TMDL cost them
$750,000 per year by restricting their ability to chop down trees on
their land.105 The Ninth Circuit, however, readily sided with the EPA,
finding their construction of section 303(d) "considerably more
97. See Roger Flynn, New Life for Impaired Waters: Realizing the Goal to 'Restore" the
Nation's Waters Under the Clean Water Act, 10 WYo. L. REV. 35, 46-47 (2010) (describing the
rebirth of the TMDL program during the 1980s and 1990s).
98. See id. (describing this evolution).
99. See id. (laying out the arguments the environmental groups advanced); Longhurst,
supra note 69, at 185-86 ("But a series of lawsuits filed by environmental groups in the 1980s
and 1990s contended that the EPA had a duty to prepare TMDLs, because the TMDLs prepared
by states were either inadequate or constructively inadequate because of the failure of a state to
create a TMDL in first place.").
100. HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 808 (5th ed. 2008).
101. The context for this question comes from the fact that 303(d) is silent on this point and
the CWA explicitly exempts agricultural runoff from the NPDES permitting requirement,
potentially supporting a construction of 303(d) that would only permit creation of TMDLs for
waters subject to both point and nonpoint source pollution.
102. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1137-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the best
construction of CWA section 303(d) requires the calculation of TMDLs for water bodies impaired
only by nonpoint sources of water pollution).
103. These groups were a collection of local, state, and national agricultural and farm
interest groups. Specifically, the Mendocino County Farm Bureau, the California Farm Bureau
Federation, and the American Farm Bureau Federation. Id. at 1129-30.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1129-31.
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convincing." 0 6 The EPA and state environmental agencies were
permitted (and even required, in certain circumstances) to formulate
and implement TMDLs for waters impaired exclusively by nonpoint
source pollution. 07 Theoretically, the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Prinsolino made section 303(d) TMDLs a powerful tool in stemming
the flow of nonpoint source water pollution.
Unfortunately, like the CWA's other nonpoint source devices,
the TMDL program continues to fall short. 08 Even with its judicially
installed teeth, section 303(d) lacks any real bite because TMDLs are
merely an "informational tool" to help states plan and implement their
own control mechanisms for nonpoint source discharges.109 As such,
the only penalty for not implementing a TMDL is the loss of federal
grant money. 10 So even if a state or the EPA is judicially obliged to
create a TMDL, nothing in section 303 compels them to implement or
enforce that TMDL."n
C. State Responses
To plug this regulatory gap and account for the difficulties of
controlling nonpoint source water pollution at the federal level, some
states have responded, but they have achieved limited levels of
success.112 States attempt to stem the flow of nonpoint source water
106. Id. at 1139. In so finding, the Ninth Circuit focused on § 303(d)'s broad language, which
mandates listing and computation of TMDLs for "those waters ... which the effluent limitations
[which are generally found in NPDES point source permits] . .. are not stringent enough to
implement any water quality standard applicable to such waters." Id. at 1135 (citing Clean
Water Act § 303(d)(1)(A)).
107. Id.
108. See Longhurst, supra note 69, at 188 (explaining that "in isolation TMDLs are not self-
implementing," and highlighting courts' attempt to increase their efficacy). But see Friends of
Pinto Creek v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 504 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2007). In Pinto Creek, the
Ninth Circuit essentially construed EPA regulations to require consideration of TMDL water
quality limitations when granting new NPDES (point source) permit authorizations. Id. Thus, if
a water is impaired, the EPA must either reduce effluent allocations for point sources or require
nonpoint source pollution reductions. Id. The effect of this can obviously be quite powerful.
109. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (characterizing TMDL as
an "informational tool"); Longhurst, supra note 69, at 187 ("The creation of the TMDL, however,
does not by itself require states or the EPA to implement the TMDL's loading restrictions.").
110. See Longhurst, supra note 69, at 187 (quoting Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1140) (noting that
the only penalty for failing to effectuate a TMDL is loss of federal grant money for water quality
control programs).
111. Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012); Longhurst, supra note 69, at 187.
112. See Longhurst, supra note 69, at 183-85 ("Some states have taken it upon themselves to
control nonpoint source pollution."). Pronsolino supplies a model example of this dilemma. There,
TMDL restrictions for nonpoint source runoff were very stringent because California decided to
enforce the TMDLs with a heavy hand. Id. This case might never have occurred in another state
since many lack robust regulatory programs to effectuate TMDL recommendations. See
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pollution in a variety of ways. California is perhaps the most
aggressive."is All point and nonpoint source dischargers in California
are governed by the Porter-Cologne Act, which requires nonpoint
dischargers to file a report for discharges.114 Then, for each discharge,
a Regional Water Quality Control Board can take one of three actions:
issue an effluent limitation, require a BMP designed to maintain the
applicable ambient water quality standard, or exempt the discharge
altogether.116 Thus, California's control scheme for nonpoint sources
attempts to mirror the CWA point source program: permits are
required for each discharge and are grounded in either effluent or
ambient water quality limitations.
On the other end of the spectrum is Minnesota's approach to
nonpoint source pollution. 16 Rather than trying to regulate every
nonpoint discharge like California, Minnesota primarily employs
voluntary devices to encourage reductions in nonpoint source
discharges.117 These devices include financial incentives, technical aid
from state agencies, education, programs, and federal funding
opportunities.118 When this largely voluntary approach fails,
Minnesota occasionally steps in and imposes a mandatory regulatory
program to force reductions, although this is rare.119
Between California's heavy-handed scheme and Minnesota's
minimalist approach states use a wide array of individualized
methods to rein in nonpoint source water pollution. 120 Wisconsin, for
example, requires farmers and livestock facilities to comply with
statutory BMPs.121 Oregon can force landowners to abide by state-
Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1129-30 (estimating compliance with state requirements would "cost the
Pronsolinos $750,000.").
113. See Longhurst, supra note 69, at 183-85 (describing a variety of state approaches
including California's).
114. CAL. WATER CODE § 13260 (West 2013); STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., CAL. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, POLICY FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE NONPOINT SOURCE
POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM 3 (2004), available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water
issues/programs/nps/docs/oalfinalcopy052604.pdf; see also Longhurst, supra note 69, at 183-84
(explaining California's nonpoint source pollution control program).
115. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., supra note 114, at 3-4; see also Longhurst, supra note
69, at 183-84 (describing this process).
116. See James M. McElfish, Jr. et al., Inventing Nonpoint Controls: Methods, Metrics and
Results, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 158-60 (2006) (laying out the contours of Minnesota's nonpoint
source regulatory program and emphasizing its voluntary nature).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Longhurst, supra note 69, at 183-85 (surveying a host of state regulatory schemes).
121. Id. at 184.
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created and state-administered water quality management plans. 122
And many states employ versions of the Minnesotan model, preferring
to rely on voluntary programs.123
In any case, it is clear that assigning states the responsibility
to control nonpoint source pollution has borne little fruit. Nonpoint
source pollution is still pervasive and represents the primary source of
water impairment throughout the country. 124 It is often difficult to
measure the relative success rates of these various state approaches
due to different pollutants prevailing in different states, differing
measurement methods, and a host of other factors. 125 However, many
scholars agree that even the state programs with the most potential
are " 'fragmented and poorly implemented' due to a lack of resources
or political will."126 As a result, "nonpoint source regulation varies
among states, territories, and tribes in both scope and types of
controls required."127
To summarize, the CWA has been successful at checking point
source discharges but feeble in the face of nonpoint source runoff. The
judicial and state efforts to fill this gap have been laudable but futile.
The localized nature of nonpoint source runoff demands a control
mechanism tailored to each specific discharge. At the same time, a
successful regulatory device must also create incentives for producers
of nonpoint source runoff-homeowners, farmers, and the like-to
temper their discharges. Given this country's past and current
regulatory failures, a new approach is needed to stem the persistent
tide of nonpoint source pollution. Private governance would effectively
supplement the CWA's nonpoint source regulatory scheme and
address many of its most significant shortcomings.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., McElfish et al., supra note 116, at 164-65 (Maryland).
124. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 9 (demonstrating that nonpoint source
pollution is pervasive and largely responsible for the impaired state of many of the nation's
waters).
125. See supra notes 93-95, 118-21 and accompanying text (describing voluntary nature of
CWA and Minnesota approaches). But see McElfish et al., supra note 116, at 164 (finding that
Minnesota's program likely reduced municipal and industrial point source discharges but largely
failed to reduce rates of agricultural runoff and other nonpoint source pollution). This is perhaps
unsurprising, given that Minnesota's approach is similar to the CWA's-stringent controls for
point sources and largely voluntary controls for nonpoint sources.
126. Longhurst, supra note 69, at 185 (quoting JESSICA DEXTER, ENvTL. LAW & POLICY CTR.,
CULTIVATING CLEAN WATER 4 (2010)).
127. Craig, supra note 64, at 190-91. Professor Craig concludes that "[w]ithout a mechanism
to make the TMDL directly enforceable against nonpoint sources that contribute to violations of
the applicable water quality standards, section 303(d) does little to fundamentally shift the
federalism balance between the states and the federal government. Nor does it render nonpoint
sources accessible to citizen suits." Id. at 228.
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IV. A PRIVATE SOLUTION TO A PUBLIC PROBLEM: USING PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE TO TACKLE NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
Sometimes traditional public regulatory programs achieve
their enumerated goals quickly and efficiently. But oftentimes this is
not the case, and government regulators are left scratching their
heads. In response to these failures, administrative law scholars have
become increasingly interested in what one commentator calls "the
private life of public law."128 The growing popularity of private
governance has not been confined to academia. Thousands of private
governance programs have sprung up in recent years across all levels
of government. 129 Each instance of private governance is unique and
tailored to tackle a different problem, so there are a variety of
different devices currently being deployed.
A. What is Private Governance?
Private governance can take several forms.130 A familiar
example is the privatization of traditionally public programs, such as
social security or prisons. 13 1 These instances of private governance
usually involve a government entity (local, state, or federal) formally
contracting with a private party to provide public services.
128. Professor Michael Vandenbergh of Vanderbilt University Law School coined the
"private life of public law" moniker in Michael Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2029-31 (2005), explaining the phrase in the context of private governance
as a response to traditionally public regulatory problems.
For scholarship on this topic, see Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (2003) (emphasizing that the difference between "the idea" of public and
private is collective and individually defined purposes); Symposium, Thirty-Third Annual
Administrative Law Issue Agencies, Economic Justice, and Private Initiatives, 53 DUKE L.J. 389
(2003) (examining the involvement of private parties in achieving government objectives); and
Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to Private Actors, 49 U.C.L.A. L.
REV 1687 (2002) (discussing private and public dynamics in the context of globalization).
129. See STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16 ("In the past five years, the number of new
[private] standards and certification programs has increased exponentially. As an indicator of
this expansion, the formal participation of standards systems in the ISEAL Alliance has grown
from eight systems in 2005 to more than 30 in 2011.").
130. See Vandenbergh, supra note 129, at 2031-32 (listing several types of private responses
to public regulatory problems).
131. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1229-31 (2003) (surveying a wide variety of instances where
conventionally public functions such as schools, prisons, welfare, and social services have been
privatized); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369-71
(2003) (surveying the same); see also Becca Aaronson, How Privatized Social Security Works in
Galveston, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/18/us/how-privatized-
social-security-works-in-galveston.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing the recent traction of
social security's privatization as a major issue).
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Alternatively, private governance can take the form of a governmental
entity working with private actors to create and implement state-
established regulatory standards. 132
Although many different private governance programs are
available, this Note focuses on one particular type:
labeling/certification systems.133 Such programs take two distinct
forms. The first is a purely private approach where the program is
developed, implemented, and enforced without any sort of government
oversight or intervention. 134 Well-known examples include fair trade
coffee, UTZ Certified tea, and certifications for fish that are
sustainably harvested or caught. 135 While purely private labeling and
certification systems are perhaps the most prevalent, hybrid public-
private programs also exist-most notably, the U.S. Energy Star
program between the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE"), the EPA,
and private appliance manufacturers. 136
The vast majority of labeling/certification programs operate in
the same fundamental fashion. 137 First, the organization running the
program sets the relevant standard based on the goals of the
organization and its mission.'38 Generally, the organization wants to
make a certain practice more sustainable by establishing a context-
specific standard, such as only fishing during a specific time of year or
132. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 129, at 2031-32 (describing this phenomenon); Jody
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285-88
(2003) (noting how norms inherent in public programs are often effectuated via these public-
private arrangements); see also Philip J. Harter & George C. Eads, Policy Instruments,
Institutions, and Objectives: An Analytical Framework for Assessing "Alternatives" to Regulation,
37 ADMIN. L. REV. 221, 227-30 (1985) (developing an analytical framework for evaluating these
schemes).
133. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Potential Role of Carbon
Labeling in a Green Economy, 34 ENERGY EcON. S53, S53-54 (2012), available at
http://uscib.org/docs/cohen.pdf (describing private labeling and certification programs in the
context of carbon labeling schemes); STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 6 ("Standards and
certification systems may have many objectives, but at their most basic they provide a
framework through which different entities [usually private] can cooperate using a common
language to deliver more sustainable practices.").
134. See STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 6-8 (detailing the development of several
purely private labeling and certification schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council).
135. Id. at 9.
136. See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 133, at S55 ("Perhaps one of the most studied
programs is the U.S. Energy Star label, a public-private partnership in which the U.S.
Department of Energy certifies consumer product that meet certain energy-efficient criteria.").
137. See STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 10 ("Although there are many variations in
the structure of standards and certification systems, most systems have the same basic
components carried out by a similar set of organizations . . . .").
138. Id. However, "[o]ther stakeholders are often engaged directly in the governance of the
standard setter." Id.
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planting a tree for every one felled. 139 Once the goals and concrete
standards are promulgated, 140 the certification body creates a system
for compliance, often relying on audits, reviews, and assessments to
evaluate companies seeking the certification/label. 141 From there,
complementary and ancillary activities begin, such as capacity
building to help interested enterprises obtain certification and public
advocacy to further the issues that the program cares about. 142 The
end result is usually a label (generally created by a third party not
associated with the relevant industry)143 that appears on approved
products. Ultimately, the labels aim to modify consumer behavior by
acting as informational tools that signal a superior product to
prospective purchasers. Superiority is measured against the program's
goal. For example, "fair trade" coffee is supposedly superior due to its
labor-friendly production methods, and "organic" produce purports to
be healthier because it is grown without the heavy use of pesticides.
Labeling/certification programs hold the greatest potential for
reducing nonpoint source water pollution for two primary reasons.
First, labeling/certification requirements are uniquely capable of
targeting individual instances of nonpoint source runoff at the point of
discharge, and second, other voluntary devices, such as technical
assistance and financial incentives, have already been tried under the
CWA to little or no avail. The remainder of this Part investigates two
specific examples of labeling/certification programs in more detail-
the Forest Stewardship Council certification scheme (a purely private
program) and the Energy Star labeling scheme (a hybrid public-
private program)-and then considers how these approaches could be
adapted to the problem of nonpoint source pollution.
139. See id. at 10-12 (describing a variety of sustainability goals for commodities such as
forests, coffee, tea, cocoa, and fish).
140. There are several different kinds of standards, ranging from "threshold standards"
(meeting all "critical" criteria and X percentage of other criteria) to "continuous improvement
models" (producers must meet entry requirements initially and additional criteria over time). See
id. at 12-13 (describing these different mechanisms more thoroughly).
141. Id. Several options for assessment and compliance exist, including self-assessment by
the producer (first-party), assessment by a trade association or another interested party (second-
party), and assessment conducted by an independent third party (third-party). Id. Issues of
auditor competence and independence are also crucial. See id. (detailing compliance and
assessment issues and mechanisms).
142. See id. at 13 (detailing these complementary activities).
143. See, e.g., id. at 78 (describing Energy Star's "independent, third-party certifiers").
Sometimes individual producers or trade associations create these labeling schemes, as opposed
to a third party advocacy group. See, e.g., id. at 52 (noting issues with S.C. Johnson's self
conferred "Greenlistsm insignia"). However, such schemes are more susceptible to allegations of
"greenwashing," which is when "consumers perceive certification as an attempt by businesses to
mislead the public about their sustainability performance." Id. at 51.
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B. Potential Models
Two labeling/certification schemes are particularly instructive
here. The Forest Stewardship Council ("FSC") certification program is
representative of the more common purely private model. FSC
manages two certification programs: Forest management certification
and chain-of-custody certification.144 Private and governmental
entities in charge of forests across the globe are potentially eligible for
forest management certification, 145 while companies that manufacture
or trade wood products can seek chain-of-custody certification. 146 FSC
will withhold certification if, for example, there is evidence of illegally
harvested wood, wood harvested from "high conservation value"
forests, or wood harvested in violation of civil rights. 147 For both
programs, the FSC developed a certification process and then
delegated authority to various "certifying bodies" such as
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Rainforest Alliance. 148 In other
words, the relevant standards are established by the FSC itself, while
the FSC-approved certifying bodies make certification decisions and
enforce the standards.
In many regards, the FSC certification programs have been
quite successful. FSC's early popularity and success spawned
analogous worldwide efforts like the Sustainable Forestry Initiative
("SFI," an industry effort) and the Pan-European Forest Certification
("PEFC," the FSC's European analog). 149 Over 174 million forest acres
144. See Become Certified, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/become-
certified.198.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (laying out the process for the two certification
programs).
145. See Forest Management Certification, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/
forest-management-certification.225.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (describing the
requirements for forest management certification).
146. See Chain-of-Custody Certification, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/
chain-of-custody-certification.201.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (describing the requirements
for chain-of-custody certification).
147. See Controlled Wood, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://us.fsc.org/controlled-
wood.203.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (listing wood products and practices that violate the
FSC standard).
148. See Certifying Bodies in the US, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
https://us.fsc.org/certifying-bodies-in-the-us.221.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (listing various
certifying bodies).
149. See STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 7:
The FSC also stimulated the development of alternative certification programs. These
additional programs include the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), initiated by the
American Forest & Paper Association (an industry association), and the Pan-
European Forest Certification (PEFC), originally created by European forest owner
associations. The PEFC ultimately was renamed the Programme for the Endorsement
of Forest Certification ....
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and 4,300 companies have achieved FSC certification,15 0 and
approximately nine percent of global forests fall under the aegis of
either FSC or PEFC standards.1 1 However, the FSC is not without its
critics. The FSC has been attacked for failing to maintain
appropriately high standards as the program has grown-a problem
that plagues many certification programs. 152 A Wall Street Journal
investigation resulted in FSC publicly revoking certification for a
group it had previously approved,153 while independent reports have
alleged that corporations successfully lie about their timber practices
to attain FSC certification. 154 Some prominent groups have responded
by removing their support for FSC. 155 Despite these shortcomings,
experts still consider FSC and its progeny to- be successful
certification/labeling systems. 156
Another instructive certification scheme is the Energy Star
program. Unlike many certification initiatives, Energy Star is a joint
public-private effort. 15 7 The DOE and EPA certify and test consumer
products (mostly appliances like refrigerators, dishwashers, and
washing machines) to determine if they outperform market metrics for
certain indicators of sustainability, such as energy efficiency and
water conservation.1 5 8 If a privately manufactured product meets or
exceeds the DOE/EPA standards, then the product may display the
Energy Star label.159 To enforce program requirements, the agencies
150. Facts & Figures, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL (Sept. 2013), http://us.fsc.org/facts-
figures.219.htm.
151. STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 9.
152. See Jeremy Hance, FSC Has 'Failed the World's Forests' Say Critics, MONGABAY.COM
(Mar. 26, 2008), http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0325-hancefsc.html (noting that the "[t]imber
certification body [is] under attack from environmentalists for slipping standards").
153. See id. (explaining how the WSJ report resulted in a public revocation of Asia Pulp &
Paper Company's certification).
154. See ENvTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY & TELAPAK, BORDERLINES: VIETNAM'S BOOMING
FURNITURE INDUSTRY AND TIMBER SMUGGLING IN THE MEKONG REGION 18-19 (2008), available
at http://www.eia-international.org.php5-20.dfwl-1.websitetestlink.com/wp-content/uploads/
reportsl60-11.pdf (detailing companies' efforts to evade and lie about FSC certification).
155. See, e.g., Hance, supra note 152 (describing how the Swedish Society for Nature
Conservation withdrew its support for the FSC).
156. See STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 7-8 ("[E]arly standards systems [such as
the FSC standard] have succeeded in carving out a highly visible place in the marketplace, which
other initiatives seek to emulate.").
157. See id. at 77 (noting that "[i]n the case of the Energy Star program, the regulator and
the certification program reside in the same government institutions").
158. See About ENERGY STAR, supra note 18 (describing the basic elements of the Energy
Star program); see also STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 77 ("Energy Star certifies that
labeled products perform better than market standards on specified dimensions of sustainability
[such as energy and water consumption] . . . ").
159. See See About ENERGY STAR, supra note 18 ("In order to earn the label, ENERGY
STAR products must be third-party certified based on testing in EPA-recognized laboratories.").
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require products to be tested in an EPA-approved laboratory and
mandate that Energy Star-approved manufacturers submit to
verification programs administered by approved certification bodies.160
Like FSC certification, the Energy Star program has been
generally effective, but not without flaws. By EPA estimates, Energy
Star eliminated over 345 million metric tons of greenhouse gas
emissions in 2010 and saved consumers and businesses $21 billion in
the form of lower utilities bills.161 Energy Star achieved these results
via extensive market penetration of the Energy Star label and a focus
on increasing consumer awareness of the cost savings from energy
efficiency. 162 Some independent analyses, however, dispute these
numbers, finding less substantial reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions and less consumer and business savings. 163 Experts have
also questioned whether the Energy Star program itself can be
credited with driving energy efficiency improvements in consumer
goods since most noncertified products still meet the Energy Star
efficiency criteria. 164 The EPA and DOE responded to these and other
charges 165 by instituting the aforementioned enforcement and
verification programs.166
In short, FSC and Energy Star both use labeling/certification
processes to reach their respective goals. Unlike many public
regulatory programs that mandate or proscribe certain behaviors with
the force of law, these certification organizations seek to voluntarily
160. STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 77-78.
161. U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR AND OTHER CLIMATE PROTECTION
PARTNERSHIPS 2 (2010), available at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/publications/
pubdocs/2010%20CPPD%2OAnnual%2OReport.pdf?c277-3d6d.
162. See STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 77-78 ("Most experts agree that the
Energy Star program has improved energy savings, increased consumer awareness of energy
efficiency, and provided some impetus for manufacturers and property owners to improve energy
efficiency."); Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 133, at 6-7, 10 ("All of these estimated
reductions are based on the market penetration of Energy Star labels and engineering-based
estimates of product usage and emissions.").
163. See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 133, at 10 (detailing academic and EPA
Inspector General reports resulting in more conservative greenhouse gas and efficiency savings
from the Energy Star program).
164. See STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 77-78 (describing the Government
Accountability Office and EPA/DOE audit findings).
165. Several other criticisms have been leveled against the Energy Star program, including
whether its standards are sufficiently rigorous, whether it "crowds out" more efficient energy
efficiency gains by setting the prevailing standard too low, and whether adequate fraud controls
are in place. Ultimately, the expert consensus is that even taking stock of these concerns, the
Energy Star program is net positive. See id. (detailing these concerns and noting that Energy
Star has been "a positive effort to shift the market's expectations regarding energy efficiency").
166. See id. ("Responding to these issues, the [Energy Star] program instituted third-party
certification based on testing in an EPA-recognized lab, and required Energy Star manufacturing
partners to participate in verification testing programs run by recognized certification bodies.").
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modify consumer behavior. Their labels act as an informational device,
signaling to buyers that the certified product is superior in some way
to comparable consumer goods.
C. Applying Private Governance to Nonpoint Source Water Pollution
Both FSC or Energy Star provides a valuable model for crafting
a private governance solution to nonpoint source water pollution.
Regardless of which design is chosen, a private governance program
for nonpoint source pollution would function in a very similar fashion.
Most importantly, a certification body would need to formulate
a dual set of sustainability standards. First, agricultural runoff is the
single largest source of nonpoint source water pollution, so one bundle
of sustainability criteria should be designed for water-intensive
agricultural products such as cereals, fruit, and vegetables. Then,
another set of sustainability standards would be established for other
consumer goods that contribute to nonpoint source water runoff, like
car oil, cleaning products, and certain plastics.167 To construct the
applicable criteria, the certifying organization would identify
manufacturing and growing practices that have been successful in
reducing nonpoint source runoff. Agricultural goods and household
products that achieve these standards would earn the right to display
a label on their goods announcing this fact. Moreover, to reduce fraud
and ensure compliance, the certification body would need to fashion a
randomized testing and verification regime similar to the Energy Star
program.
The internal organization of a private governance program for
nonpoint source pollution could track either the FSC or Energy Star
design. A program modeled after the FSC would be purely private,
without any governmental role. A nongovernmental organization
("NGO") like the International Water Association or the World Water
Council 68 would develop and enforce the relevant certification
standards. On the other hand, under the Energy Star model, a
governmental body would fashion and implement the certification
standards and labeling scheme. The most likely design would be a
167. This pollution usually falls under "urban runoff' or "stormwater discharges" when
examining the NSSI. As the EPA notes, "[a]lthough individual homes might contribute only
minor amounts of NPS [nonpoint source] pollution, the combined effect of an entire neighborhood
can be serious." ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MANAGING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION FROM
HOUSEHOLDS, available at http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/outreach/pointlO.cfm.
168. For a more thorough listing of potential nongovernmental organizations that might be
suitable for running such a program, see Water & Wastewater International NGOs, ECOGATEWAY
LINK CTR., http://www.ecoiq.com/onlineresources/center/water/ngos.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2013).
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partnership between the EPA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
("USDA").169
While the identity of the certifying body (private versus public)
is not vital to the success of a certification scheme for nonpoint source
pollution, the choice might influence the program's reputability and
cost. A governmentally run program could generate more legitimacy
but at increased cost to the taxpayer. 170 Ultimately, a hybrid program
is probably preferable. The relatively modest dip into the public coffers
that occurs with hybrid programs is likely outweighed by valuable
legitimacy and publicity gains conferred by governmental
involvement. The ubiquity of Energy Star provides strong evidence of
this fact. Unfortunately, the current climate of fiscal austerity in the
federal government makes creation of such a program unlikely at best.
So what are the costs and benefits of a public-private
certification program for nonpoint source pollution, and would it
actually work? There are numerous benefits. Most importantly, a
private governance approach has the unique ability to resolve the two
largest roadblocks to stemming nonpoint source pollution: targeting
discharges at the source and incentivizing polluters171 to stop
discharging. Private governance accomplishes both tasks by creating a
system that differentiates between goods that are produced in a
water-friendly manner (by minimizing nonpoint source pollution
during production, manufacturing, growing, or shipping) and goods
that are not. This differentiation generates an important market
signal-the label on approved products-that illustrates to consumers
that certified products are better for protecting their drinking water,
ocean views, and favorite boating and swimming spots. As certified
products grow in popularity, sellers are incentivized to switch to more
water quality-friendly processes so they too can obtain an eco-friendly
label.172 The end result is that individual generators of nonpoint
169. This is a natural partnership, like the EPA/DOE joint administration of the Energy Star
program. The EPA has the necessary expertise to run most facets of this hypothetical program
but the USDA's subject-matter experience with agriculture pollution will be essential.
170. Running Energy Star jointly cost the DOE and EPA approximately $290 million from
2007 to 2011. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-888, ENERGY STAR: PROVIDING
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADDITIONAL REVIEW OF EPA's DECISIONS COULD STRENGTHEN THE PROGRAM
9 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11888.pdf.
171. The connotation of the word "polluter" in ordinary parlance sometimes assumes that the
individuallentity discharging the pollutant is not engaging in a socially beneficial or acceptable
behavior. Thus, someone using a household cleaning solution or a farmer applying a fertilizer
might not fall under this understanding of the term. For the purposes of this Note, however,
those actions and individuals are precisely what "polluter" is intended to cover.
172. As noted previously, this can be done by utilizing a superior production process with
less chemicals, applying less or different fertilizers, and so forth.
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source pollution-producers, growers, households, etc.-are
encouraged to eliminate their specific discharges.
In fact, there is empirical evidence that the market responds to
labeling programs dedicated to protecting the environment. Three out
of four consumers who bought Energy Star-labeled products, for
instance, indicated that the Energy Star designation was an
"important factor" in their purchasing decision.173 About seventeen
percent of coffee, eight percent of tea, and seven percent of fish
harvested globally comply with a certification and labeling program,
underscoring the strong consumer demand for these certified goods.174
Thus, private governance can succeed-where previous attempts have
failed-by employing a market mechanism targeted at both consumers
(by creating a device that signals a superior and more
environmentally friendly product) and producers (by incentivizing
cleaner production and growing processes).
Not only can private governance potentially resolve the two
most stubborn barriers to meaningfully reducing nonpoint source
water pollution, but such a scheme offers several important ancillary
benefits as well. Unlike more onerous command-and-control
regulatory approaches, private governance provides a softer
regulatory touch. This is particularly important in the context of
nonpoint source runoff because of the strong agricultural and industry
interests that would fight off any more direct or draconian
alternatives. 7 5 In fact, the development of a ubiquitous label could
even result in producers and growers embracing the private
governance scheme; the recent development of an organic food market
supplies a prime example of how producers can take advantage of a
certification scheme to differentiate themselves in an otherwise
homogenous market.176 Private governance also imposes little to no
mandatory costs on either producers or consumers. Given that any
compulsory regulatory device would be virtually certain to impose
such costs, this is an important advantage. Of course, a successful
scheme will likely ask consumers to pay a price premium for certified
173. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 170, at 77 ("Consumer surveys
show that among those who knowingly bought Energy Star-labeled products, 75 percent said the
label was an important factor in their choice . . .
174. Id. at 9.
175. This is why agricultural runoff is wholly exempted from the CWA's point source permit
and technology requirements.
176. See, e.g., STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 17, at 9 (describing the substantial market
share for several organic commodities such as coffee, tea, and cocoa).
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goods.1'7 However, the widespread success of sustainability
certification programs, despite a price premium, suggests this effect
will be modest at most.178
There are, however, other potential problems pertaining to the
administration of a certification program for nonpoint source
pollution. First, it will be difficult to devise appropriate sustainability
standards for thousands of individual consumer goods; each fruit,
vegetable, cleaning solution, and home product possesses a unique
chemical makeup and thus has a different effect on water quality.
There are also concerns about greenwashing (i.e., the use of
certification to deflect or replace stricter regulation), particularly if the
program is devised and implemented by a trade group or nonprofit
with close ties to the industry. Finally, many certification programs
provide tangible benefits to consumers, such as electricity savings
(Energy Star) or health benefits (organic food);179 however, consumers
who primarily drink bottled water or who live in landlocked areas may
not appreciate reductions in water pollution. Thus, many consumers
may not realize the utility of a water quality labeling scheme.
These obstacles are far from insurmountable. First, a
complementary informational campaign highlighting how nonpoint
source pollution impairs individuals' drinking water (bottled or
otherwise) and their favorite boating, swimming, or vacation locales
would muster public support for the labeling program. Sustainability
movements in other developed countries demonstrate how
informational campaigns can be successful in shaping public
opinion. 80 Second, to head off allegations of greenwashing, the
program could be administered in partnership with the USDA and
DOE, which would also help ensure compliance and promote the
program's legitimacy. Even a purely private program, however, can
avoid charges of greenwashing by staying sufficiently independent of
industry and trade organizations. Finally, the administrative burden
of devising individual product standards can be eased by consulting
with NGOs focused on water quality, as well as other certification
177. See id. (detailing the price premiums consumers pay for other certified commodities
such as cocoa, coffee, and tea).
178. See id. (describing the ubiquity and major market share of products that have complied
with certification programs).
179. See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 133, at 11 (holding out Energy Star as an
example of a program that offers "a very significant 'private' component to it even without any
'warm glow' or altruism.").
180. See Daniel A. Farber, Sustainable Consumption, Energy Policy, and Individual Well-
Being, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1512 (2012) (listing efforts in countries such as Japan, Germany,
Portugal, and Sweden, to implement "communications campaigns encouraging more sustainable
consumption").
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programs that have already integrated water quality metrics into
their sustainability criteria.
V. CONCLUSION
Although a private governance approach to the stubborn
problem of nonpoint source water pollution is far from perfect, it holds
significant promise and minimal risk. Unlike past attempts to rein in
nonpoint source pollution, private governance will cost little to
implement. And, by relying on the market to drive pollution reduction,
private governance can engender the support of both consumers and
producers, while targeting specific discharges at their source and
generating real incentives for pollution reductions. Private governance
is no panacea, but it can and should be part of a serious effort to tackle
the final frontier of water impairment. The costs are low, the stakes
are high, and the potential for success is substantial.
Kyle W. Robisch*
* J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, Class of 2014. I would like to thank
Professor Michael Vandenbergh for his invaluable assistance in envisioning and refining this
Note and the staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review for the countless hours they spent editing this
Note. Without the continuous and unconditional support of my family and Sue and Bernard
Orlowski, both this Note and my legal education would have been impossible.
568 [Vol. 67:2:539
